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Abstract
Recommendation systems are information-filtering systems that help users deal with in-
formation overload. Unfortunately, current recommendation systems prompt serious pri-
vacy concerns. In this work, we propose an architecture that enables users to enhance their
privacy in those systems that profile users on the basis of the items rated. Our approach cap-
italizes on a conceptually-simple perturbative technique, namely the suppression of ratings.
In our scenario, users rate those items they have an opinion on. However, in order to avoid
being accurately profiled, they may want to refrain from rating certain items. Consequently,
this technique protects user privacy to a certain extent, but at the cost of a degradation in
the accuracy of the recommendation.
We measure privacy risk as the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the user’s and the
population’s rating distribution, a privacy criterion that we proposed in previous work. The
justification of such a criterion is our second contribution. Concretely, we thoroughly inter-
pret it by elaborating on the intimate connection between the celebrated method of entropy
maximization and the use of entropies and divergences as measures of privacy. The ulti-
mate purpose of this justification is to attempt to bridge the gap between the privacy and
the information-theoretic communities by substantially adapting some technicalities of our
original work to reach a wider audience, not intimately familiar with information theory
and the method of types. Lastly, we present a formulation of the optimal trade-off between
privacy and suppression rate, what allows us to formally specify one of the functional blocks
of the proposed architecture.
1 Introduction
From the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web (WWW), the amount of infor-
mation available to users has grown exponentially. Today, due to this information overload,
users feel they have to separate the wheat from the chaff. Recommendation systems are a
type of information-filtering systems that assist users in this task by suggesting information
items they may be interested in. Examples of these systems include recommending books,
music, and other products at Amazon.com [1], movies by MovieLens [2] and Netflix [3], and
news at Digg [4].
One of the most popular forms of interaction in recommendation systems is that users
communicate their preferences by rating items. This is the case of Movielens, where users
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Figure 1. The profile of a user is modeled in Movielens as a histogram of absolute
frequencies of ratings within a set of movie genres (bottom). Based on this profile,
the recommender predicts the rating that the user would probably give to a movie
(top). After having watched the movie, the user rates it and their profile is updated.
assign ratings to movies they have already watched. Other strategies to capture users’
interests include asking them to sort a number of items by order of predilection, or suggest-
ing that they mark the items they like. On the other hand, recommendation systems may
collect data from users without requiring them to explicitly convey their interests [5]. Such
practices include observing the items clicked by users in an online store, analyzing the time
it takes users to examine an item, or simply keeping a record of the purchased items.
The prolonged collection of these data allows the system to extract an accurate snapshot
of user interests or user profiles. Once this information has been captured, the recommen-
dation system applies an algorithm that returns a prediction of users’ interests for those
items they have not yet considered. For example, Movielens and Digg apply collaborative-
filtering algorithms [6, 7] to predict the rating that a user would give to a movie and to
create a personalized list of recommended news, respectively. Fig. 1 illustrates the case of
Movielens and provides an example of user profile.
Despite the many advantages recommendation systems are bringing to users, the infor-
mation collected, processed and stored by these systems prompts serious privacy concerns.
One of the main privacy risks perceived by users is that of a computer “figuring things
out” about them [8]. Namely, many users are worried about the idea that their profiles
may reveal sensitive information such as health-related issues, political preferences, salary
or religion. On the other hand, other users are concerned that the system’s predictions may
be totally erroneous and be later used to defame them. The latter situation is illustrated
in [9], where the accuracy of the predictions provided by TiVo digital video recorder and
Amazon is questioned. Specifically, the author describes several real cases in which the
recommender makes dubious, and in some cases aberrant, inferences about users’ sexual
preferences. Lastly, other privacy risks embrace unsolicited marketing, information leaked
to other users of the same computer, court subpoenas, and government surveillance [8].
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Consequently, it is not surprising that some users are reticent to disclose their interests.
Actually, a report [10] finds that 95% of the respondents refused, at some point, to provide
personal information when requested by a Web site. In a nutshell, this just reinforces the
fact that refusing to give private information may be considered as a strategy accepted by
users concerned with their privacy.
1.1 Contribution and Plan of this Paper
In this work, we tackle the problem of protecting user profiles in recommendation systems.
With this purpose, we present an architecture that enables users to enhance their privacy in
those systems where they are profiled on the basis of their ratings. Our approach relies upon
a conceptually-simple mechanism, namely the suppression of ratings. In our scenario, users
rate those items they have an opinion on. However, in order to avoid being accurately
profiled, they may wish to refrain from rating certain items. Therefore, this approach
protects user privacy to a certain extent, without having to trust the recommendation
system or the network operator, but at the cost a loss in utility, a degradation in the
accuracy of the prediction.
We measure user privacy as the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the user’s and
the population’s rating distribution, a criterion that we presented in previous work [11].
Our second contribution is precisely the interpretation of this privacy metric, which con-
templates the entropy of the user’s item distribution as a particular case. In this work,
we thoroughly justify this measure, by elaborating on the intimate connection between the
celebrated method of entropy maximization and the use of entropies and divergences as
measures of privacy. This justification also attempts to bridge the gap between the privacy
and the information-theoretic communities by substantially adapting some technicalities
of our original work to reach a wider audience, not intimately familiar with information
theory and the method of types.
In addition, we present an information-theoretic, mathematical formulation of the trade-
off between privacy and suppression rate. Our formulation results in a convex optimization
problem for which there exist efficient numerical methods to solve it. Last but not least,
we would like to stress that our approach could benefit from the combination with other
alternatives in the literature.
Sec. 2 reviews some relevant approaches aimed at preserving user privacy in recommen-
dation systems. Sec. 4 describes a privacy-protecting architecture based on the suppression
of ratings. In addition, this section presents the model of user profile assumed, the adver-
sarial model and our privacy measure. It is not until Sec. 5 where we shall carefully justify
this privacy metric. Later in Sec. 6 we introduce a formulation of the trade-off between
privacy and suppression rate. Conclusions are drawn in Sec. 7.
2 State of the Art
In this section, first we overview some of the most prominent privacy mechanisms in the
motivating scenario of this work, namely recommendation systems; and secondly, we touch
upon the most popular privacy metrics.
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2.1 Privacy-Enhancing Mechanisms
Numerous approaches have been proposed to protect user privacy in the context of recom-
mendation systems. These approaches basically suggest three main strategies: perturbing
the information provided by users, using cryptographic techniques, and distributing the
information stored by recommenders.
In the case of perturbative methods for recommendation systems, [12] proposes that
users add random values to their ratings and then submit these perturbed ratings to the
recommender. After receiving these ratings, the system executes an algorithm and sends
the users some information that allows them to compute the prediction. When the number
of participating users is sufficiently large, the authors find that user privacy is protected to
a certain extent and the system reaches a decent level of accuracy. However, even though a
user disguises all their ratings, it is evident that the items themselves may uncover sensitive
information. In other words, the simple fact of showing interest in a certain item may be
more revealing than the ratings assigned to that item. For instance, a user rating a book
called “How to Overcome Depression” indicates a clear interest in depression, regardless of
the score assigned to this book. Apart from this critique, other works [13, 14] stress that
the use of randomized data distortion techniques might not able to preserve privacy.
In line with this work, [15] applies the same perturbative technique to CF algorithms
based on singular-value decomposition (SVD). More specifically, the authors focus on the
impact that their technique has on privacy. For this purpose, they use the privacy metric
proposed by [16], which is essentially equivalent to differential entropy, and conduct some
experiments with data sets from Movielens and Jester [17]. The results show the trade-
off curve between accuracy in recommendations and privacy. In particular, they measure
accuracy as the mean absolute error between the predicted values from the original ratings
and the predictions obtained from the perturbed ratings.
At this point, we would like to remark that the use of perturbative techniques is by no
means new in other application scenarios such as private information retrieval (PIR). In
this scenario, users send general-purpose queries to an information service provider. An
example would be a user sending the query “What was George Orwell’s real name?”. A
perturbative approach to protect user profiles in this context consists in combining genuine
with false queries. In this sense, [11] proposes a non-randomized method for query forgery
and investigates the trade-off between privacy and the additional traffic overhead.
Regarding the use of cryptographic techniques, [18, 19] propose a method that enables
a community of users to calculate a public aggregate of their profiles without revealing
them on an individual basis. In particular, the authors use a homomorphic encryption
scheme and a peer-to-peer (P2P) communication protocol for the recommender to perform
this calculation. Once the aggregated profile is computed, the system sends it to users,
who finally use local computation to obtain personalized recommendations. This proposal
prevents the system or any external attacker from ascertaining the individual user profiles.
However, its main handicap is assuming that an acceptable number of users is online and
willing to participate in the protocol. In line with this, [20] uses a variant of Pailliers’
homomorphic cryptosystem which improves the efficiency in the communication protocol.
Another solution [21] presents an algorithm aimed at providing more efficiency by using
the scalar product protocol.
In order to mitigate the potential privacy risks derived from the fact that users’ private
information is kept in a single repository, some approaches suggest that this information be
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stored in a distributed way. This is the case of [22], which presents a CF algorithm called
PocketLens, specifically designed to be deployed to a P2P scenario. The algorithm in ques-
tion enables users to decide which private information should exchange with other users of
the P2P community. In addition, the authors provide several architectures for the prob-
lem of locating neighbors. Another alternative assumes a pure decentralized P2P scenario
and proposes the use of several perturbative strategies [23]. In essence, this scheme could
be regarded as a combination of the approaches in [22] and [12]. Namely, the mentioned
scheme recommends replacing the actual ratings by fixed, predefined values, by uniformly
distributed random values, and by a bell-curve distribution imitating the distribution of
the population’s ratings.
2.2 Privacy Criteria
In this section we give a broad overview of privacy criteria originally intended for statistical
disclosure control (SDC), but in fact applicable to the domain of recommendation systems,
the motivating application of our work. In database privacy, a microdata set is defined
as a database table whose records carry information concerning individual respondents.
Specifically, this set contains key attributes, that is, attributes that, in combination, may
be linked with external information to reidentify the respondents to whom the records in
the microdata set refer. Examples include job, address, age and gender, height and weight.
In addition, the data set contains confidential attributes with sensitive information on the
respondent, such as health, salary and religion.
A common approach in SDC is microaggregation, which consists in clustering the data set
into groups of records with similar tuples of key attributes values, and replacing these tuples
in every record within each group by a representative group tuple. One of the most popular
privacy criteria in database anonymization is k-anonymity [24], which can be achieved
through the aforementioned microaggregation procedure. This criterion requires that each
combination of key attribute values be shared by at least k records in the microdata set.
However, the problem of k-anonymity, and of enhancements [25–28] such as l-diversity, is
their vulnerability against skewness and similarity attacks [29]. In order to overcome these
deficiencies, yet another privacy criterion was considered in [30]: a dataset is said to satisfy
t-closeness if for each group of records sharing a combination of key attributes, a certain
measure of divergence between the within-group distribution of confidential attributes and
the distribution of those attributes for the entire dataset does not exceed a threshold t.
An average-case version of the worst-case t-closeness criterion, using the Kullback-Leibler
divergence as a measure of discrepancy, turns out to be equivalent to a mutual information,
and lend itself to a generalization of Shannon’s rate-distortion problem [31,32].
A simpler information-theoretic privacy criterion, not directly evolved from k-anonymity,
consists in measuring the degree of anonymity observable by an attacker as the entropy of
the probability distribution of possible senders of a given message [33,34]. A generalization
and justification of such criterion, along with its applicability to PIR, are provided in [11,35].
3 Statistical and Information-Theoretic Preliminaries
This section establishes notational aspects, and, in order to make our presentation suited
to a wider audience, recalls key information-theoretic concepts assumed to be known in the
remainder of the paper, specially in Sec. 5 where we justify our privacy metric.
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The measurable space in which a random variable (r.v.) takes on values will be called
an alphabet, which, with a mild loss of generality, we shall always assume to be finite.
We shall follow the convention of using uppercase letters for r.v.’s, and lowercase letters
for particular values they take on. The probability mass function (PMF) p of an r.v. X
is essentially a relative histogram across the possible values determined by its alphabet.
Informally, we shall occasionally refer to the function p by its value p(x). The expectation
of an r.v. X will be written as EX, concisely denoting
∑
x x p(x), where the sum is taken
across all values of x in its alphabet.
We adopt the same notation for information-theoretic quantities used in [36]. Concor-
dantly, the symbol H will denote entropy and D relative entropy or KL divergence. We
briefly recall those concepts for the reader not intimately familiar with information theory.
All logarithms are taken to base 2. The entropy H(p) of a discrete r.v. X with probability
distribution p is a measure of its uncertainty, defined as
H(X) = −E log p(X) = −
∑
x
p(x) log p(x).
Given two probability distributions p(x) and q(x) over the same alphabet, the KL divergence
or relative entropy D(p ‖ q) is defined as
D(p ‖ q) = Ep log p(X)
q(X)
=
∑
x
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
.
The KL divergence is often referred to as relative entropy, as it may be regarded as a
generalization of entropy of a distribution, relative to another. Conversely, entropy is
a special case of KL divergence, as for a uniform distribution u on a finite alphabet of
cardinality n,
D(p ‖u) = log n−H(p). (1)
Although the KL divergence is not a distance in the mathematical sense of the term,
because it is neither symmetric nor satisfies the triangle inequality, it does provide a measure
of discrepancy between distributions, in the sense that D(p ‖ q) ≥ 0, with equality if, and
only if, p = q. On account of this fact, relation (1) between entropy and KL divergence
implies that H(p) 6 log n, with equality if, and only if, p = u. Simply put, entropy
maximization is a special case of divergence minimization, attained when the distribution
taken as optimization variable is identical to the reference distribution, or as “close” as
possible, should the optimization problem appear accompanied with constraints on the
desired space of candidate distributions.
4 Privacy Protection in Recommendation Systems via the Sup-
pressing of Ratings
In this section, we present our first contribution: an architecture for the protection of user
profiles in recommendation systems. Particularly, we consider the case in which users’
preferences are exclusively derived from the ratings they assign to items. Our approach
is based on a perturbative technique, namely the suppression of ratings to items. In our
scenario, users rate items according to their personal preferences. However, in order to
avoid being accurately profiled, they may want to refrain from rating some of those items.
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Figure 2. A user retrieves a particular item and the ratings submitted by the other
users to it, from a recommendation system (a). Later, the user submits their own
ratings to such recommender (b). Afterwards, the user receives a privacy alarm
when trying to submit a new rating (c), because their actual profile deviates signifi-
cantly from the population distribution of ratings.
We would like to stress that our approach could be integrated with other systems, like for
example, with some of the approaches mentioned in Sec. 2, and those using pseudonyms [37,
38].
In the rest of this section, we provide further insight into our proposal. Concretely, we
propose a mathematical model of user profiles in Sec. 4.1. Afterwards, Sec. 4.2 examines
the assumed adversarial model. Next, our privacy criterion is presented in Sec. 4.3, but it
is not until Sec. 5 when we shall thoroughly justify this metric. Lastly, we delve into our
architecture and analyze each of its internal components in Sec. 4.4.
4.1 User Profile
We pointed out in Sec. 1 that Movielens uses histograms of absolute frequencies to show
user profiles. Other systems such as Jinni and Last.fm represent this information by means
of a tag cloud, which may be regarded as another kind of histogram. In this spirit, recent
privacy-protecting approaches in the scenario of recommendation systems propose using
histograms of absolute frequencies [39,40].
According to all these examples, and as used in [11,35,41], we propose a tractable model
of user profile as a PMF, that is, a histogram of relative frequencies of ratings within a
predefined set of categories of interest. We would like to remark that, under this model,
user profiles do not capture the particular scores given to items, but what we consider to
be more sensitive: the categories these items belong to. This corresponds to the case of
Movielens, which we illustrate in Fig. 1. In this example, a user assigns two stars to a movie,
meaning that they consider it to be “fairly bad”. However, the recommender updates their
profile based only on the categories this movie belongs to.
Having assumed the above model, now we focus on how to estimate the profile of a
user from their ratings. The reason is that our approach requires this information to help
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users decide which items should be rated and which should not. Clearly, the easiest way
to obtain a user profile is by asking the recommender. Movielens users, for instance, can
do that. Unfortunately, in most recommendation systems users do not have access to this
information. In order to cope with this, we suggest an alternative for extracting users’
preferences from their rating activity.
We consider two possible cases for the information that a system shows about its items.
The trivial case is when the recommender provides users with a categorization of all of its
items. In this situation, it is straightforward to keep a histogram based on these categories.
This is the case of Netflix or Movielens, where the genres of all movies are available to users.
On the contrary, it may happen that this categorization is not at the disposal of users. This
applies to Digg, where the only information that the recommender provides about news is
the headline, the first lines of the news and the source of information. In systems like this,
the categorization of items may be accomplished by exploring web pages with information
about those items. Specifically, this process could be carried out by using the vector space
model [42], as normally done in information retrieval, to represent these web pages as tuples
containing their most representative terms. Namely, the term frequency-inverse document
frequency (TF-IDF) could be applied to calculate the weights of each term appearing in a
web page. Next, the most weighted terms of each web page could be combined in order to
create a category and assign it to the item. After obtaining the categories associated with
all the items rated by a user, their profile would be computed as a histogram across these
categories.
4.2 Adversarial Model
In our scenario, we suppose users interact with recommendation systems that infer their
preferences based only on their ratings. This supposition is reinforced by the tractability of
the model considered and also by the fact that implicit mechanisms are often less accurate
than explicit ratings [43].
Under this assumption, we consider an adversarial model in which users submitting
their ratings are observed by a passive attacker who is able to ascertain which ratings are
associated with which items. Concretely, this could be the case of the recommendation
system itself or, in general, any privacy attacker able to crawl through this information.
Bearing in mind the model of user profile assumed in Sec. 4.1, after the rating of a
sufficiently large number of items, the attacker can compute a histogram with the actual
interests of a particular user. However, when this user adheres to the suppression of ratings,
the attacker observes a perturbed version of this histogram, which makes it more difficult
for the attacker to discover the user’s actual preferences. We shall refer to this perturbed
profile as the user’s apparent profile. Last but not least, we suppose that the attacker is
unaware of or ignores the fact that the user is adopting our strategy, thereby assuming that
the apparent profile reflects genuine interests.
4.3 Privacy Metric
Any optimized mechanism aimed at protecting the privacy of users necessarily requires
to evaluate the extent to which it is effective. In this work, just as in [11, 35], we use
an information-theoretic quantity to emphasize that an attacker will have gained some
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Figure 3. Block diagram of the proposed architecture.
information about a user whenever their preferences diverge from the average population
interests.
Specifically, inspired by the privacy criteria proposed in [32], we consider the KL diver-
gence [36], introduced in Sec. 3, which may be interpreted as a measure of discrepancy
between probability distributions. Accordingly, we measure privacy risk as the KL diver-
gence between the apparent profile s resulting from the elimination of certain ratings and
the population distribution of ratings p, namely D(s ‖ p). The justification and interpre-
tation of this measure of privacy is the purpose of Sec. 5. A formulation of the trade-off
between privacy and suppression is presented later in Sec. 6.
4.4 Architecture
In this section, we describe an architecture that helps users decide which items should
be rated and which should not, in order to hinder privacy attackers in their efforts to
profile users’ interests. Our architecture is conceived to be implemented by a software
application running on the user’s local machine. Fig. 3 shows the proposed architecture,
which consists of a number of modules, each of them performing a specific task. Next, we
provide a functional description of all of its modules and examine the details of a practical
implementation.
Communication Manager. This module is in charge of interacting with the recom-
mendation system. Specifically, it downloads information about the items the user finds
when browsing the recommender’s web site. This information may include a description
about the items, the ratings that other users assigned to them, and the categories of interest
these items belong to. In Amazon, for instance, all this information is available to users.
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However, as commented on in Sec. 4.1, this is not always the case. For this reason, our
approach incorporates modules intended to retrieve the population’s ratings and categorize
all the items that the user explores.
On the other hand, this module receives the ratings sent by the suppression alarm gen-
erator. Afterwards, the module submits these ratings to the recommendation system.
Category Extractor. This component is responsible for obtaining the categories the
items belong to. To this end, the module uses the information provided by the commu-
nication manager. Should this information not be enough, the module will have to get
additional data by searching the Web or by querying an information provider. Afterwards,
the categorization of these items is carried out by using the vector space model and the TF-
IDF weights as commented on in Sec. 4.1. In a last stage, this module sends the items and
their corresponding categories to the user. If the user has an opinion about these items,
then the user proceeds to rate them.
User Profile Constructor. This module is responsible for the estimation of the user
profile. To this end, the module is provided with the items that the user rates, i.e., those
items capturing their preferences. Based on the received items, this block generates the
user profile as described in Sec. 4.1. Note that the items received by this module are not
necessarily those ultimately submitted to the recommender—after rating each item, the
user is advised on the suitability of sending it to the system. Obviously, during this pro-
cess, the module discards those rated items that were already considered in the histogram
computation.
Population Profile Constructor. This module is responsible for the estimation of
the population’s profile. For this purpose, the block continuously receives items captured
by the communication manager. Alternatively, this block could query databases containing
this kind of information. This would be the case, for example, of a future application similar
to Google Insight.
Suppression Strategy Generator. This block is the centrepiece of the architecture as
it is directly responsible for the user privacy. First, the block is provided with the user profile
and the population’s profile. In addition, the user specifies a suppression rate σ, which is
the relative frequency of ratings that the user is disposed to eliminate. Having specified this
rate, the module computes the optimum tuple of suppression r∗, which contains information
about the ratings that should be suppressed. More accurately, the component ri is the
percentage of ratings to items that our architecture suggests eliminating in the category i.
An example of this is represented in Fig. 4, where we suppose that the user agrees to
eliminate σ = 15% of their ratings. Based on this rate, the block calculates the optimal
tuple r∗. In this example, the tuple r∗ indicates that the user should refrain from rating
5% of the items belonging to the category 1 and 10% in the category 2. This is consistent
with the fact that the actual user profile slightly deviates from the population’s profile in
these categories.
In the end, this tuple is sent to the suppression alarm generator. Later in Sec. 6, we
provide a more detailed specification of this module by using a formulation of the trade-off
between privacy and suppression rate, which will enable us to compute the tuple r∗.
Suppression Alarm Generator. This module is responsible for warning the user when
their privacy is being compromised. Concretely, this module receives the tuple r∗. When
the user decides to assign a rating to one of the items categorized by the category extractor,
the module proceeds as follows. First, this item is sent to the user profile constructor, which
updates the profile. Secondly, if r∗ has a positive component in at least one of the categories
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Figure 4. Here we illustrate an example in which a user with profile q is disposed
to eliminate σ = 15% of their total number of ratings. Based on the user profile,
the average population profile and the suppression rate, our approach computes
the optimal tuple r∗, which provides the user with the proportion of items that they
should eliminate in each category.
the item belongs to, a privacy alarm is generated to alert the user, and it is then for the
user to decide whether to ultimately eliminate the rating or not. However, if r∗ is zero for
all components, our architecture does not become aware of any privacy risk and the rating
is sent to the communication manager module. This process is repeated provided that the
user attempts to rate an item they have an opinion on.
In order to illustrate how this block works, suppose that it receives the tuple of sup-
pression shown in Fig. 4. According to this, the block would trigger an alarm if the user
decided to rate an item classified into the categories 1 or 2. On the contrary, if the user
wanted to rate an item belonging to any of the other categories, the system would forward
this rating to the recommender.
After having explored each of the modules of the architecture, next we shall describe how
our approach would work. Initially, the user would browse the recommendation system’s
web site and would find some items. In order for the user to obtain future recommendations
from the system, they would have to rate some of those items. Before proceeding, though,
our approach would retrieve information about the items and extract the categories they
belong to. Afterwards, the user would try to rate one of those items, what would update
the user profile and allow our system to compute the tuple r∗. In the end, our approach
could suggest refraining from rating the item. Should this be the case, the user would have
to decide whether to send the rating or not.
5 Justification of Entropy and Divergence as Measures of Privacy
In this section, we shall justify and interpret the privacy metric considered in our approach,
already introduced in Sec. 4.4. Since KL divergence is a generalization of Shannon’s entropy,
we shall find that our interpretation may also be extended to entropy as a measure of
privacy. For that purpose, we shall adopt the perspective of Jaynes’ celebrated rationale
on entropy maximization methods [44], which builds upon the method of types [36, §11],
a powerful technique in large deviation theory whose fundamental results we proceed to
review.
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The first part of this section will tackle an important question. Suppose we are faced with
a problem, formulated in terms of a model, in which a probability distribution plays a major
role. In the event this distribution is unknown, we wish to assume a feasible candidate.
What is the most likely probability distribution? In other words, what is the “probability
of a probability” distribution? We shall see that a widespread answer to this question relies
on choosing the distribution maximizing the Shannon entropy, or, if a reference distribution
is available, the distribution minimizing the KL divergence with respect to it, commonly
subject to feasibility constraints determined by the specific application at hand.
Our review of the maximum entropy method is crucial because it is unfortunately not
always known in the privacy community, and because the rest of this paper constitutes a
sophisticated illustration of its application, in the context of the protection of the privacy
of user profiles. As we shall see in the second part of this section, the key idea is to model a
user profile as a histogram of relative frequencies across categories of interest, regard it as
a probability distribution, apply the maximum entropy method to measure the likelihood
of a user profile either as its entropy or as its divergence with respect to the population’s
average profile, and finally take that likelihood as a measure of anonymity.
5.1 Rationale behind the Maximum Entropy Method
A wide variety of models across diverse fields have been explained on the basis of the
intriguing principle of entropy maximization. A classical example in physics is the Maxwell-
Boltzmann probability distribution p(v) of particle velocities V in a gas [45, 46] of known
temperature. It turns out that p(v) is precisely the probability distribution maximizing
the entropy, subject to a constraint on the temperature, equivalent to a constraint on the
average kinetic energy, in turn equivalent to a constraint on EV 2. Another well-known
example, in the field of electrical engineering, of the application of the maximum entropy
method, is Burg’s spectral estimation method [47]. In this method, the power spectral
density of a signal is regarded as a probability distribution of power across frequency, only
partly known. Burg suggested filling in the unknown portion of the power spectral density
by choosing that maximizing the entropy, constrained on the partial knowledge available.
More concretely, in discrete case, when the constraints consist in a given range of the
crosscorrelation function, up to a time shift k, the solution turns out to be a kth order
Gauss-Markov process [36]. A third and more recent example, this time in the field of
natural language processing, is the use of log-linear models, which arise as the solution to
constrained maximum entropy problems [48] in computational linguistics.
Having motivated the maximum entropy method, we are ready to proceed to describe
Jaynes’ attempt to justify, or at least interpret it, by reviewing the method of types of large
deviation theory, a beautiful area lying at the intersection of statistics and information
theory. Let X1, . . . , Xk be a sequence of k i.i.d. drawings of an r.v. uniformly distributed
in the alphabet {1, . . . , n}. Let ki be the number of times symbol i = 1, . . . , n appears in
a sequence of outcomes x1, . . . , xk, thus k =
∑
i ki. The type t of a sequence of outcomes
is the relative proportion of occurrences of each symbol, that is, the empirical distribution
t =
(
k1
k , . . . ,
kn
k
)
, not necessarily uniform. In other words, consider tossing an n-sided fair
dice k times, and seeing exactly ki times face i. In [44], Jaynes points out that
H(t) = H
(
k1
k
, . . . ,
kn
k
)
' 1
k
log
k!
k1! · · · kn! for k  1.
12
International Jour  of Security and Its Applications 
Vol. 6 No. 2, April, 2012
72
Loosely speaking, for large k, the size of a type class, that is, the number of possible
outcomes for a given type t (permutations with repeated elements), is approximately 2kH(t)
in the exponent. The fundamental rationale in [44] for selecting the type t with maximum
entropy H(t) lies in the approximate equivalence between entropy maximization and the
maximization of the number of possible outcomes corresponding to a type. In a way, this
justifies the infamous principle of insufficient reason, according to which, one may expect
an approximately equal relative frequency ki/k = 1/n for each symbol i, as the uniform
distribution maximizes the entropy. The principle of entropy maximization is extended to
include constraints also in [44].
Obviously, since all possible permutations count equally, the argument only works for
uniformly distributed drawings, which is somewhat circular. A more general argument [36,
§11], albeit entirely analogous, departs from a prior knowledge of an arbitrary PMF t¯, not
necessarily uniform, of such samples X1, . . . , Xk. Because the empirical distribution or type
T of an i.i.d. drawing is itself an r.v., we may define its PMF p(t) = P{T = t}; formally, the
PMF of a random PMF. Using indicator r.v.’s, it is straightforward to confirm the intuition
that ET = t¯. The general argument in question leads to approximating the probability p(t)
of a type class, a fractional measure of its size, in terms of its relative entropy, specifically
2−kD(t ‖ t¯) in the exponent, i.e.,
D(t ‖ t¯) ' −1
k
log p(t) for k  1,
which encompasses the special case of entropy, by virtue of (1). Roughly speaking, the
likelihood of the empirical distribution t exponentially decreases with its KL divergence
with respect to the average, reference distribution t¯.
In conclusion, the most likely PMF t is that minimizing its divergence with respect
to the reference distribution t¯. In the special case of uniform t¯ = u, this is equivalent
to maximizing the entropy, possibly subject to constraints on t that reflect its partial
knowledge or a restricted set of feasible choices. The application of this idea to justify the
privacy criterion assumed in our approach is the object of the remainder of this section.
5.2 Measuring the Privacy of User Profiles
We are finally equipped to justify, or at least interpret, our proposal to adopt Shannon’s
entropy and KL divergence as measures of the privacy of a user profile. Before we dive in, we
must stress that the use of entropy as a measure of privacy, in the widest sense of the term,
is by no means new. Shannon’s work in the fifties introduced the concept of equivocation
as the conditional entropy of a private message given an observed cryptogram [49], later
used in the formulation of the problem of the wiretap channel [50, 51] as a measure of
confidentiality. More recent studies [33, 34] rescue the suitable applicability of the concept
of entropy as a measure of privacy, by proposing to measure the degree of anonymity
observable by an attacker as the entropy of the probability distribution of possible senders of
a given message. More recent work has taken initial steps in relating privacy to information-
theoretic quantities [11,30–32].
In the context of this paper, an intuitive justification in favor of entropy maximization
is that it boils down to making the apparent user profile as uniform as possible, thereby
hiding a user’s particular bias towards certain categories of interest. But a much richer
argumentation stems from Jaynes’ rationale behind entropy maximization methods [44,52],
13
International Jour  of Security and Its Applications 
                                       Vol.6No. 2,April, 2012
73
more generally understood under the beautiful perspective of the method of types and large
deviation theory [36, §11], which we motivated and reviewed in the previous subsection.
Under Jaynes’ rationale on entropy maximization methods, the entropy of an apparent
user profile, modeled by a relative frequency histogram of categorized queries, may be re-
garded as a measure of privacy, or perhaps more accurately, anonymity. The leading idea
is that the method of types from information theory establishes an approximate mono-
tonic relationship between the likelihood of a PMF in a stochastic system and its entropy.
Loosely speaking and in our context, the higher the entropy of a profile, the more likely it
is, and the more users behave according to it. This is of course in the absence of a proba-
bility distribution model for the PMFs, viewed abstractly as r.v.’s themselves. Under this
interpretation, entropy is a measure of anonymity, not in the sense that the user’s identity
remains unknown, but only in the sense that higher likelihood of an apparent profile, be-
lieved by an external observer to be the actual profile, makes that profile more common,
hopefully helping the user go unnoticed, less interesting to an attacker assumed to strive
to target peculiar users.
If an aggregated histogram of the population were available as a reference profile, the
extension of Jaynes’ argument to relative entropy, that is, to the KL divergence, would
also give an acceptable measure of privacy (or anonymity). Note that is precisely the
assumption made in the architecture described in Sec. 4, where the population’s profile
is available to users. Recall from Sec. 3 that KL divergence is a measure of discrepancy
between probability distributions, which includes Shannon’s entropy as the special case
when the reference distribution is uniform. Conceptually, a lower KL divergence hides
discrepancies with respect to a reference profile, say the population’s, and there also exists
a monotonic relationship between the likelihood of a distribution and its divergence with
respect to the reference distribution of choice, which enables us to regard KL divergence
as a measure of anonymity in a sense entirely analogous to the above mentioned. In fact,
KL divergence was used recently in our own work [11,35] as a generalization of entropy to
measure privacy, although the justification used built upon a number of technicalities, and
the connection to Jaynes’ rationale was not nearly as detailed as in this manuscript.
6 Formulation of the Trade-Off Privacy and Suppression Rate
In this section, we present a formulation of the optimal trade-off between privacy and
suppression rate. In the absence of a thorough study, our formulation considers this rate as
a measure of the degradation in the accuracy of the recommendations. This simplification
allows us to formulate the problem of choosing a suppression tuple as a multiobjective
optimization problem that takes into account privacy and suppression rate. As we shall
show later, this formulation will enable us to go into the details of one of the functional
blocks of the architecture described in Sec. 4.4.
Next, we formalize some of the concepts that we introduced in Sec. 4. Specifically, we
model the items in a recommendation system as r.v.’s taking on values in a common finite
alphabet of categories, namely the set {1, . . . , n} for some n ∈ Z+. Accordingly, we define q
as the probability distribution of the items a user has an opinion on, that is, the distribution
capturing the actual preferences of the user. In line with Sec. 4.4, we introduce a rating
suppression rate σ ∈ [0, 1), modeling the proportion of items that the user consents to
eliminate. Bearing this in mind, we define the user’s apparent item distribution s as q−r1−σ
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for some suppression strategy r = (r1, . . . , rn) satisfying qi > ri > 0 and
∑
ri = σ for
i = 1, . . . , n. In light of this definition, the user’s apparent item distribution may be
interpreted as the result of the suppression of some ratings of items and the posterior
normalization by 11−σ so that
∑
i si = 1.
Taking into account the definition of our privacy criterion, justified previously in Sec. 5,
we shall suppose that the population is large enough to neglect the impact of the choice of
r on p. Accordingly, we define the privacy-suppression function
R(σ) = min
r
qi>ri>0,
∑
ri=σ
D
(
q − r
1− σ ‖ p
)
, (2)
which poses the optimal trade-off between privacy (risk) and suppression rate and enables
us to specify the module suppression strategy generator in Sec. 4.4. More accurately, this
functional block will be in charge of solving the optimization problem (2).
There are two important advantages in modeling the privacy of a user profile as a diver-
gence in general, or an entropy in particular, in this and other potential applications of our
privacy criterion. First, the mathematical tractability demonstrated in [11]. Secondly, the
privacy-suppression function has been defined in terms of an optimization problem, whose
objective function is convex, subject to an affine constraint. As a consequence, this problem
belongs to the extensively studied class of convex optimization problems [53] and may be
solved numerically, using a number of extremely efficient methods, such as interior-point
methods.
7 Concluding Remarks
There exist numerous proposals for the protection of user privacy in recommendation sys-
tems. Within those approaches, the suppression of ratings arises as a simple mechanism in
terms of infrastructure requirements, as users need not trust the recommender. Nonetheless,
the application of this privacy-enhancing technique comes at the cost of some processing
overhead and, more importantly, at the expense of a degradation in the accuracy of the
recommendations.
Our first contribution is an architecture that implements the suppression of ratings in
those recommendation systems that profile users exclusively from their ratings. We de-
scribe the functionality of the internal modules of this architecture. The centrepiece of
our approach is a module responsible for computing a tuple containing information about
which ratings should be eliminated. Our architecture uses then this information to warn
the user when their profile diverges from the population’s rating distribution. The user is
who finally decides whether to follow the recommendations made by our approach or not.
Privacy risk is measured as the KL divergence between the user’s rating distribution
and the population’s, a criterion that we proposed in previous work [11] for query forgery
in PIR. The justification of this criterion in the scenario of recommendation systems is
our second contribution. First, we thoroughly interpret this metric by elaborating on the
intimate connection between the celebrated method of entropy maximization and the use of
entropies and divergences as measures of privacy. Measuring privacy enables us to optimize
it, drawing upon powerful tools of convex optimization. The entropy maximization method
is a beautiful principle widely used in fields such as physics, electrical engineering and even
natural language processing. Secondly, we attempt to bridge the gap between the privacy
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and the information-theoretic communities by substantially adapting some technicalities of
our original work to reach a wider audience, not intimately familiar with information theory
and the method of types. As neither information theory nor convex optimization are fully
widespread in the privacy community, we elaborate and clarify the connection with privacy
in far more detail, and hopefully in more accessible terms, than in our original work.
Lastly, we present a mathematical formulation of the optimal trade-off between privacy
and suppression rate, which arises from the definition of our privacy criterion. This formu-
lation allows us to specify the module responsible for user privacy in our architecture.
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